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Misallocation and Manufacturing TFP in Korea 
By JIYOON OH* 
This paper analyzes the effects of allocative efficiency on productivity 
in the manufacturing sector of Korea following Hsieh and Klenow 
(2009). The results of this research indicate that the overall allocative 
efficiency declined from 1990 to 2012. Using the method of Oberfield 
(2013), which allows inter-industry resource movement as well as 
intra-industry reallocation, we confirm that intensified misallocation 
generally results from intra-industry allocative inefficiency. The 
potential loss from instances of worsening misallocation is estimated 
to be approximately 0.6% points for each year, which is considerable 
in terms of the overall TFP. In terms of the firm size distribution, 
initially large establishments are more likely to expand if distortions 
are removed in most countries. One notable feature in Korea is that 
this pattern is pronounced. This implies that subsidies to unproductive 
small-sized establishments are heavily implemented. 
Key Word: Misallocation, Productivity Differences,  
Misallocation by Establishment Size 
JEL Code: O11, O47, O53 
 
 
  I. Introduction 
 
roductivity differences have received attention as a principal source of the gap 
between rich and poor countries. There are two main directions of research on 
productivity. Traditionally, many studies compare the productivity growth of a 
representative (average) firm for each country. Growth accounting is a typical 
strategy used in this strand. Another approach focuses on the heterogeneity of firms 
or industries and pays attention to allocative efficiency. The distribution of firm 
productivity within the same industry is known to be highly dispersed; thus, 
resource redistributions toward more productive cases generates higher TFP growth 
throughout the economy, even if the productivity level of each firm does not 
change.  
Emphasizing allocative efficiency has been a growing trend and is currently 
popular. Hsieh and Klenow (2009, HK henceforth) developed an empirical  
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methodology for measuring TFP losses due to instances of resource misallocation. 
They compared the extent of misallocations for the U.S., China, and India using 
plant-level data from the manufacturing sector of each country. In the absence of 
misallocation, the U.S. can achieve an increase of output of approximately 30-43%, 
while China and India can enjoy rates of 87-115% and 100-128%, respectively. 
What they refer to as “misallocation” roughly alludes to inefficiency, which is 
measured as the ratio of current output relative to the potential output resulting 
from the removal of exogenous distortions. This potential output is hypothetically 
achieved in the absence of differences apart from productivity differences. Each 
firm/plant differs in terms of their technology or efficiency level when creating 
their products. Only in terms of productivity should the amount of factor inputs be 
distributed according to the relative order of firm productivity. In reality, this is not 
the case. All other factors affecting allocation except for productivity are regarded 
as distortions.  
The HK methodology has several shortcomings; one of them is that it 
investigates allocative efficiency only within industries. In the HK method, the 
total amounts of capital and labor in each industry are fixed and do not very 
between industries. This weakness shuts down the flexibility of factor movement 
during industry-specific shocks. Oberfield (2013) developed a measure of 
allocative efficiency along the lines of Hsieh and Klenow (2009), allowing 
resource movement between industries. He found an interesting phenomenon 
during the 1982 crisis in the Chilean manufacturing sector. A severe contraction in 
output during this period is mostly accounted for by a falling Solow residual, and a 
decline in between-industry allocative efficiency contributes to the drop in TFP 
while the within-industry efficiency remains constant.  
Following the HK methodology, observations from many countries were also 
reported. Using plant data from the French manufacturing sector, Bellone and 
Mallen-Pisano (2011) argued that allocative efficiency in France is comparable to 
that in the U.S. Particularly, Hosono and Takizawa (2012) reported that 
misallocation in the manufacturing sector in Japan has been deepening since the 
1980s. The unique point in their paper is that it determined the time series of 
misallocation over time as well as the overall level of misallocation compared to 
those in other countries. For Japan, they showed that the improvement in the TFP 
would be 47% if misallocation disappears. Bartelsman et al. (2013), who 
developed their own criterion to quantify misallocation, showed that approximately 
15% of TFP losses can be accounted for by distortions in resource allocation in the 
transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe.  
In this paper, we quantitatively measure the extent of misallocation in the 
Korean manufacturing sector and compare it with those in other countries 
following the same methodology used by Hsieh and Klenow (2009). Although 
Midrigan and Xu (2009) have analyzed capital misallocation using the same data, 
their derivation of capital frictions is based on the assumption that other inputs 
such as labor and intermediate inputs are allocated efficiently without friction. The 
HK calculation considers labor misallocation as well as capital misallocation; thus, 
the efficient output differs from that of Midrigan and Xu (2009).  
This study also shows how efficiency in this sector has evolved over the past 20 
years. The time-series trend in allocative efficiency is another contribution of our 
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paper compared to the data results by Midrigan and Xu (2009), who mainly pool 
all year-plant observations while focusing on cross-sectional variations of capital 
productivity. With regard to robustness checks, we will investigate our results 
through the lens of the methodology developed by Oberfield (2013).  
The main results here are as follows. Korea’s average allocative efficiency is 
found to be lower than that of the U.S., higher than that of China, and similar to 
that of Japan. Allocative efficiency in the U.S. was 0.73 (highest) while that of 
China was 0.50 (lowest).1 The rates for Korea and Japan are similar at 0.65 and 
0.68, respectively. Meanwhile, the time series shows that Korea’s allocative 
efficiency in the manufacturing has been trending downward since the 1990s. This 
downward trend in Korea is similar to that of Japan when it began to experience 
slowing growth in the 1990s. A downward trend consistently appears after allowing 
for inter-industry resource allocation.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II describes the HK and Oberfield (2013) 
methodologies heavily relied on by the present paper. In Section III, we report the 
empirical results. Section IV briefly summarizes possible reasons for misallocation 
in the Korean manufacturing sector. Section V presents our concluding remarks. 
 
II. Previous Methodology 
 
In this section, we illustrate the backbone frames of Hsieh and Klenow (2009) 
and Oberfield (2013) which will be used for the empirical analysis here.  
Hsieh and Klenow (2009) provide a quantitative methodology pertaining to the 
potential effect of resource misallocation on the aggregate TFP. In an economy 
with heterogeneous production units, aggregate TFP depends not only on the TFPs 
of individual production units but also on how the inputs are allocated across these 
production units. If firm productivity is the single factor of heterogeneity, it is 
natural for input resources such as capital and labor to be distributed according to 
productivity differences. However, if there are firm-level distortions which are not 
related to productivity, resource allocation may damage aggregate productivity via 
a process known as misallocation. In Hsieh and Klenow (2009), the reasons for 
distortions are not primarily studied, but the types of distortions noted are taxes and 
subsidies, financial friction, trade restrictions, capital rationing, a host of 
regulations associated with firm-size-dependent policies, industrial policies, and 
entry barriers. In other words, distortions are the reduced forms of all possible 
sources which generate resource misallocation other than productivity.  
How can we measure distortions (wedge) in real data? Can we identify 
differences in firm productivity and firm distortions? The answers can be found 
based on a standard model of monopolistic competition with heterogeneous 
productivity. With the Cobb-Douglas production function and constant elasticity of 
substitution between differentiated goods, firm markup is fixed and equal to all 
firms. Thus, revenue productivity (the product of physical productivity and a firm’s 
output price) should be equal across firms in the absence of distortion. To the 
 
1This figure represents the ratio of current output relative to the potential output in the absence of 
misallocation.  
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extent revenue productivity differs across firms, a measure of firm-level distortion 
can be recovered. Although industry variance with regard to physical productivity 
exists, industry variance in revenue productivity vanishes in the absence of 
distortion.  
The details of Hsieh and Klenow (2009) are presented below. Goods markets 
consist of final goods and industry goods. A final good (Y ) is produced by a 
representative firm in a perfectly competitive final output market. Industry goods 
( sY ) are aggregated by way of Cobb-Douglas production. 
 
(1) 
1
S
ss
Y Y   
 
where 
1
1S ss    
Industry output sY  is a CES aggregate of sM  differentiated products.  
 
(2) 
1
1
1
( )Ms siiY Y
 
 


   
 
Because individual products are produced in a monopolistic competition market, 
price elasticity is always ( 1)   regardless of the production volume, and the 
markup is / ( 1).     
Firm production is determined with the Cobb-Douglas function with 
productivity ,siA  capital siK  and labor .siL  Firm productivity siA  (physical 
productivity: TFPQ) differs across firms. Capital elasticity ,s  determining the 
income shares of capital and labor, is equal across firms within an industry but may 
not be equal across firms between industries.  
 
(3) 1s ssi si si siY A K L
   
 
A firm pursues profit maximization, as expressed by (4). si siP Y  denotes revenue 
in this case. w  and R  are the wage rate and capital rental rate, which are 
identical for all firms. Output distortion Ysi  and capital distortion Ksi  are unique 
in this setup. These types of taxes represent the reduced forms of distortion faced 
by firms. Ysi  alters the marginal productivity of capital and labor at the same 
proportion, but Ksi  interferes with the relative marginal productivity of capital 
over labor.  
 
(4) (1 ) (1 )si Ysi si si si Ksi siP Y L RK         
 
From the perspective of first-order conditions, Ysi  and Ksi  can be viewed 
from several perspectives. As expressed by (5), we infer the presence of capital 
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distortion Ksi  when the ratio of labor compensation to the capital stock differs 
relative to what one would expect from the degree of output elasticity with respect 
to capital and labor. Ksi  is positive in a firm paying higher capital costs, and Ksi  
is negative if the labor cost is relatively high. The ratio of the marginal productivity 
of labor relative to capital is different from the industry mean, and Ksi  is not 
equal to zero. Similarly, output distortion is measured when labor’s share is 
different compared with what one would expect given the degree of industry 
elasticity of output with respect to labor. Ysi  represents the extent of the deviation 
of marginal revenue labor productivity (1 )( / )si si siP Y L   from the wage rate 
/ ( 1) .w      
 
(5) 1
1
s si
Ksi
s si
L
RK
      
 
(6) 1
1 (1 )
si
Ysi
s si si
L
P Y
       
 
Additionally, Ksi  and Ysi  in equations (5) and (6) converge to the industry 
mean once a hypothetical reform transpires. Note that the industry means of the 
distortions in the real data do not have to be zero. Meaningful interpretations of 
Ksi  and Ysi  refer to how much they differ from the industry mean instead of 
focusing on the degrees of the absolute deviation from zero.  
Calculated values of Ksi  and Ysi  are reflected in the revenue productivity 
.siTFPR  All other factors are common, but this is not the case for the last instance 
in (7). Even firm productivity siA  does not make a difference with regard to
.siTFPR  In the monopolistic competition frame, a firm with high productivity 
wants to lower its prices to raise its quantity of sales; thus, productivity itself is 
irrelevant with reference to the product of price and productivity. Only  
(1 ) / (1 )sKsi Ysi
    is the single factor generating the variance of siTFPR  within 
an industry.  
 
(7) 1
(1 )
( )( ) ( )
1 1 (1 )
s
s s Ksi
si si si
s s Ysi
R
TFPR P A

   
   
        
 
The next hurdle is to measure the physical productivity .siA  This calculation is 
heavily dependent on the functional form of the CES aggregator of industry goods. 
With a strong assumption of the production form, physical productivity is 
recovered from the nominal output .si siP Y  Because s  is common to firms 
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within an industry, it can be normalized as 1.  
 
(8) 
1
1
( )
s s
si si
si s
si si
P Y
A
K L


 

   where 
1
1 1( ) /ss s s sPY P
      
 
Industry TFP is given as in equation (9); it is produced by the sum of physical 
TFP( siA  ) of each firm weighted by /s siTFPR TFPR  (deviation from the average 
industry TFPR). When an individual firm’s output and capital distortions ( Ksi &
Ysi ) collapse to the average industry level, meaning a firm’s siTFPR  is equal to 
the industry ,sTFPR the industry sTFP  becomes equal to 1 1/( 1)( ) .s siA A
     
   
(9) 
1
1 1
1
1
( ( ) )
s
s s
M
s s
s si
is s si
Y TFPR
TFP A
K L TFPR
 
 
 


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With (9) and the formula of ,sA  we can calculate the ratio of the current output 
(Y ) to the efficient output ( efficientY ) via equation (10).  
 
(10) / ( 1)1
1
( ) ( ( ) )
s
s s
M
s si s
s s
iefficient sis s
TFP A TFPRY
Y TFPRA A
   

      
 
We will make a comparison between the HK method and the reallocation effect. 
Before explaining reallocation effects in growth accounting, we assume that every 
firm has its own productivity level and that it is fixed. Essentially, the reallocation 
effect means that increasing the market share of a firm with higher productivity 
causes an economy-wide TFP improvement. The philosophy of the HK method is 
very similar to the basic concept of the reallocation effect except that it emphasizes 
firm heterogeneity caused not only by the firm’s own productivity but also by 
distortion. When the government gives a particular firm a subsidy for its final 
products or provides access to inexpensive money, the marginal cost of the firm 
decreases as well as output increases relative to firms with identical productivity 
levels. Differing from the reallocation effect, the HK method suggests a 
quantitative degree of output loss caused by distortion, as explained above. In other 
words, the HK method presents the potential output if the allocative efficiency is 
maximized in the absence of distortion.  
There are several limitations which apply to the HK method. First, 
misspecification error is one of the most crucial limitations, as the HK method 
relies fairly thoroughly on functional forms. If each firm has different levels of 
production elasticity of capital ( si s  ) caused by a technical gap in firms, Ksi   
and Ysi  measured by the HK methodology consider the technical gap as a 
distortion. In fact, allocative efficiency is not clearly related to the technical gap or 
INSIDabcdef_:MS_0001MS_0001
IN
SI
D
ab
cd
ef
_:
M
S_
00
01
M
S_
00
01
VOL. 38 NO. 3     Misallocation and Manufacturing TFP in Korea  43 
to the capital elasticity of the firm. Even a social planner is not able to overcome 
this constraint of technological differences between firms. The assumption of 
identical markups for every firm also produces measurement error in reality; Ysi   
represents this gap when the firm’s markup differs according to size.  
Second, as mentioned above, the HK method is available for measuring the 
efficiency of only intra-industry firms. Inter-industry reallocations of capital and 
labor are not allowed during an industry-specific shock. Depending on the 
industrial policy of the government, inter-industry resource allocations can be 
affected even when the efficiency of intra-industry firms is not influenced. The HK 
method cannot detect this type of inter-industry resource allocation. Considering 
that many emerging countries implement industrial policies, this shortcoming may 
be a crucial limitation when this method is applied to emerging countries.  
Third, the HK method does not take entries or exits into account explicitly. 
According to the literature, the quantitative size of the extensive margin (entries 
and exits) on TFP is not negligible and is more important than the extent of the 
intensive margin (incumbent firms). Entries and exits are frequent in the 
manufacturing sector, and fluctuation in the TFPR variance can be affected by 
entries and exits. For instance, if increasing demand in a particular industry causes 
more firms to enter it, the TFPR variance can increase and result in an increase in 
misallocations in the HK method.  
Oberfield (2013) partly overcomes these shortcomings of the HK methodology. 
Although Oberfield (2013) depends on functional forms and does not consider the 
effects of entries and exits, his methodology relaxes the strong assumption that 
each firm has the same elasticity of capital. An important improvement by the 
methodology of Oberfield (2013) is that the decomposition of intra-and inter-
industry misallocation can be accomplished by allowing free movement of inputs 
between industries. The key is that input reallocation between firms depends not 
only on firm productivity siA  but also on the elasticity of capital .si  This 
implicitly makes input movement between industries possible. 
 
III. Empirical Results 
 
In this section, we use survey data from the mining and manufacturing industries 
supplied by the Korea statistics office. This survey contains every establishment 
with more than 10 employees and reports value-added, sales, employment, and 
several types of capital stocks and investment. Data starting in 1990 is available, 
but 2010 is excluded due to serious numbers of missing values for capital stocks.  
Before calculating the gains from hypothetical liberalization from distortions, we 
trim the 1% tails of log( / )ssiTFPR TFPR   and log( / )si siA A  across industries. 
We then recalculate the variables used as components. In the periods analyzed, the 
standard industrial classification in Korea was revised three times (1991, 1998, and 
2006); hence, the time-series discontinuities at the industry level may affect the 
results. Thus, we unify the industry classification for all periods at the three-digit 
level with the eighth industrial classification. A unit of this data is an establishment  
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TABLE 1—DISPERSION OF TFPQ VALUES 
Korea 
1992 1998 2001 2008 2012 
S.D. 0.98  1.03  0.96  0.97  0.94  
p75-p25 1.29  1.38  1.22  1.14  1.10  
p90-p10 2.46  2.65 2.43  2.37  2.27  
N 45,334  40,697  50,736  55,401  59,967  
The U.S. 
1977 1987 1997 
S.D. 0.85 0.79 0.84 
p75-p25 1.22 1.09 1.17 
p90-p10 2.22 2.05 2.18 
N 164,971 173,651 194,669 
China  
1998 2001 2005 
S.D. 1.06 0.99 0.95 
p75-p25 1.41 1.34 1.28 
p90-p10 2.72 2.54 2.44 
N 95,980 108,702 211,304 
 
TABLE 2—DISPERSION OF TFPR VALUES 
Korea 
1992 1998 2001 2008 2012 
S.D. 0.55  0.62  0.54  0.57  0.55  
p75-p25 0.70  0.80  0.66  0.65  0.63  
p90-p10 1.42 1.60 1.37  1.38 1.31 
N 45,334  40,697  50,736  55,401  59,967  
The U.S. 
1977 1987 1997 
S.D. 0.45 0.41 0.49 
p75-p25 0.46 0.41 0.53 
p90-p10 1.04 1.01 1.19 
N 164,971 173,651 194,669 
China 
1998 2001 2005 
S.D. 0.74 0.68 0.63 
p75-p25 0.97 0.88 0.82 
p90-p10 1.87 1.71 1.59 
N 95,980 108,702 211,304 
 
and not a firm in this survey. For convenience, we use firm and establishment 
interchangeably and only connote a difference between them when necessary. 
Table 1 and Table 2 show that variances of TFPQ and TFPR for Korea, the U.S. 
and China. The data for the U.S. and China are quoted from Hsieh and Klenow 
(2009), but observations of Japan are not available. TFPQ indicates the physical 
productivity of a firm. This variable shows that the variance for Korea is greater 
than that of the U.S. and similar to that of China. However, the dispersion of TFPQ 
is not directly related to distortions in resource allocation, as technological 
differences between firms can be endogenous.  
The variance of TFPR is closely related to misallocation. The standard deviation 
and the interquartile range of the Chinese data are largest in both cases, while those 
in the U.S. data are the smallest. From Tables 1 and 2, we know that the variance of 
the TFPR of China is larger than that of Korea despite the fact that the variance of 
the TFPQ of Korea is larger than that of China for 1998, indicating less distortion  
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TABLE 3—OUTPUT DISTORTION AND CAPITAL DISTORTION IN KOREA AND JAPAN 
      Korea      Japan 
 siY
   
siK
  
siY
  
siK
  
S.D. 0.584 25.656 1.63 14.17 
N 1,154,534 1,154,534 3,565,341 3,565,341 
 
TABLE 4—TFP GAINS AFTER EQUALIZING TFPR WITHIN INDUSTRIES 
Korea Japan The U.S.  China 
No output distortion & No capital distortion 
TFP gap, / efficientY Y    0.6482 0.679 0.733 0.502 
TFP gain, 1/efficientY Y   54.27% 47.18% 36.60% 99.17% 
No output distortion  
TFP gap 0.816 0.810 N.A. N.A. 
TFP gain 22.52% 23.40% N.A. N.A. 
 
in the Korean manufacturing sector compared to that in China. The variance of the 
TFPR of China converges to a level similar to that of Korea; thus, distortion in the 
Chinese manufacturing sector appears to be relieved. Caution is needed when 
making a comparison of the results of each country because differences in 
sampling can affect the results.  
Table 3 shows the standard deviations of Ysi   and Ksi  from the Korean data 
from 1990 to 2012 and from the Japanese data from 1981 to 2008. Korea has a 
smaller standard deviation of Ysi  than Japan, but Korea’s variance of Ksi  is two 
times higher than the Japanese case. Literally, Korea has greater distortion in the 
relative price of capital to labor than that in Japan.   
The ultimate purpose of this paper is to calculate the ratio of realized output to 
efficient output, as in (10). Table 4 shows these results by country. Keeping in mind 
that a careful comparison is required due to the different periods and sampling 
methods, a descending order in terms of allocative efficiency is as follows: U.S., 
Japan, Korea and China. In the absence of output and capital distortion, there is no 
significant difference between Korea (0.648) and Japan (0.679). If output distortion 
is eliminated, the ratios of current to efficient output are 0.816 for Korea and 0.810 
for Japan, also indicating that distortion in either output market or capital market 
does not contribute solely to the results.  
We also investigated changes in allocative efficiency in the time-series data. 
Figure 1 indicates that / ,efficientY Y  remaining at 0.68 until the mid-1990s, 
decreased sharply during the Asian Financial Crisis during the years 1997 and 
1998. In the early 2000s, it recovered to 0.65 but declined toward 2008 (the year 
the financial crisis struck), after which it showed a minor increase in 2012.  
The downward trend of allocative efficiency is still valid in plants that survive 
for all of the years and remain in the sample. In the sample, the entry rates are 
between 12 and 27% and the exit rates range from 11% to 26%. In order to check if 
the time series of allocative efficiency ( / efficientY Y ) was mainly driven by changes in 
the productivity distribution caused by entering and exiting plants, we construct a  
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FIGURE 1. CHANGES IN THE ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY / efficientY Y  OF  
KOREA’S MANUFACTURING FIRMS  
 
Note: 1) Korea’s 2010 Survey of Mining and Manufacturing is a complete enumeration survey. However, the 
capital items account has been removed due to omitted data to ensure continuity.  
Source: Author’s calculation of the Survey of Mining and Manufacturing by Statistics Korea. 
 
TABLE 5—TRENDS OF ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY IN KOREA AND JAPAN 
Korea Japan 
90-99 2000-12 80-90 90-99 2000-08 
No output distortion & No capital distortion 
TFP gap 0.6742 0.6264 0.696 0.676 0.666 
TFP gain 48.32% 59.64% 43.7% 47.9% 50.2% 
No output distortion 
TFP gap 0.8445 0.7925 0.830 0.809 0.792 
TFP gain 18.41% 26.18% 20.5% 23.6% 26.3% 
 
balanced panel. It was found that the time-series pattern of allocative efficiency 
does not change much compared to the original exercise. This finding implies that 
the fluctuation of misallocation is not greatly influenced by dropping unproductive 
plants and adding productive ones in Korea.  
Table 5 summarizes the trend changes in Korea and Japan. By calculating the 
TFP gain ( / 1efficientY Y  ), which indicates the potential advantage of eliminating 
misallocations, we find that the inefficiency of Japanese manufacturing firms 
increased through the 1980s to the 2000s. The gain from hypothetical liberalization 
in Japan is 43.7% in 1980, 47.9% in 1990 and 50.2% in 2000 (until 2008). In 
Korea, the TFP gain becomes 59.64% in the 2000s, and it stood at 48.32% in 1990, 
meaning that instances of misallocation has deepened at a rapid speed compared to 
that in Japan. When only the output market distortion is removed, the TFP 
increases by 18% in the 1990s and by 26% in the 2000s. Although both Korea and 
Japan undergo worsening degrees of capital distortion, the speed of the increase in 
inefficiency in the capital market is much faster in Korea.  
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This result may change depending on the data treatment for outliers. In this 
paper, we cut the top and bottom of 1%, following Hsieh and Klenow (2009). 
When the threshold increases by 2%, the level of inefficiency slightly falls off as 
variance of siTFPR  decreases. However the increasing trend of inefficiency 
remains apparent. Extreme values of the upper tail and lower tail do not control the 
empirical results.  
The aggregation of industrial classification can affect the results. We calculate 
/ efficientY Y  with the two-digit industrial classification. In this case, the variance of 
siTFPR  increases; thus, / efficientY Y  falls compared to the use of three-digit 
aggregation. However, the degree of intensified misallocation does not make a 
major change at all. Moreover, the pattern of the decreasing trend in efficiency 
remains valid even when the two-digit classification scheme is used. Therefore, 
aggregation of the industrial classification does not alter the results significantly.   
Productivity studies show that the contribution of a firm’s entry and exit is 
quantitatively considerable. Although the method does not consider extensive 
margins, entries and exits occur frequently in the actual data. A balanced panel was 
established to observe the effects of entries and exits on / efficientY Y . We constructed 
the balanced panel of data in two parts. The first consists of establishments 
surviving from 1990 to 1999, and the second contains firms which were operating 
from 2000 to 2012. If only firms who survive for the entire period (1990-2012) are 
selected, a limited number of firms remain, leading to survivorship bias. The results 
from the two parts of the balanced panel depict time-series trends which are quite 
similar to that in the original result. The effects of entries and exits appear to be 
limited for this measure of allocative efficiency.   
Oberfield (2013) overcomes the limitations of the HK method by allowing that 
① firms within an industry can have different degrees of capital elasticity to 
output, and ② factors can move between industries. Following Oberfield (2013), 
we can confirm that the technological differences between firms do not determine 
the main result of the decreasing trend of allocative efficiency. An important point 
from the results in Oberfield (2013) is that within-industry misallocation is the 
main contributor to inefficiency in the Korean case, in contrast to the Chilean 
manufacturing sector.  
Figure 2 suggests that the overall allocative efficiency, ,bothM  has trended 
downward from the 1990s onward. bothM  consists of WM  and ,BM  which 
denote the extent of misallocation for intra-industry and inter-industry cases, 
respectively. As shown in the graph, intra-industry allocative efficiency drives 
bothM  down, while inter-industry misallocation does not show significant changes 
over time. Note that the level of ,WM  the counterpart of allocative efficiency in 
the HK method, is slightly higher than that in the HK method because WM  allows 
individual capital elasticity, which was regarded as a form of distortion by Hsieh 
and Klenow (2009). 
Table 6 presents TFP decomposition caused by the technological advances of  
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FIGURE 2. CHANGES IN INTRA-INDUSTRY AND  
INTER-INDUSTRY ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY LEVELS 
 
TABLE 6—DECOMPOSITION OF TFP 
(UNIT: %) 
TFP Resource allocative efficiency Technological progress 
1991~1999 5.90 -0.60 6.50 
2000~2009 5.39 -0.53 5.92 
Total 5.63 -0.57 6.19 
Note: 1) The author adopted Oberfield’s (2013) method and calculated the TFP using the original data from the 
Survey of Mining and Manufacturing. Results regarding TFP growth rates may differ depending on the 
calculation method used.  
 
a representative firm and the changes in misallocation. In the Korean 
manufacturing sector, the annual TFP (Solow residual) growth rate was 
approximately 5.6% on average during 1990-2009 and the allocative efficiency 
( ln lnW Bd M d M ) worsened by nearly 0.6% on an annual basis. In other words, 
the TFP growth rate would have reached 6.2% if there had been no degeneration of 
allocative efficiency. “0.6%” is not a minor amount considering that increasing TFP 
growth by 1% cannot easily be done with artificial policies. 
 
IV. Analysis of Changes in Allocative Efficiency 
 
In order to analyze the factors behind the changes in allocative efficiency, this 
section investigates at the efficiency distributions of firms by size and age.  
/ efficientY Y  can be calculated at the level of each establishment. The current 
output of a firm is proportional to its productivity and distortion in (11). The 
percentage deviations of the current output si siP Y  from the efficient output 
* *
si siP Y  
are expressed by (12). If 
siY
  is smaller and 
siK
  is larger than the industry mean, 
it is beneficial for the aggregate output for this plant to increase its production 
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because * *si siP Y  is greater than .si siP Y  If there is a negative correlation between 
siY
  and ,
siK
  * * /si si si siP Y P Y  would be amplified.  
 
(11) 
1 1
( 1)
(1 )
(1 ) s
Ysi si
si si
Ksi
A
P Y
 
 


 

    
 
(12) * *
1 1
log( ) log( ) ( 1) log( ) ( 1) log( )
1 1
Ys Ks
si si si si s
Ysi Ksi
P Y P Y
    
         
 
Table 7 shows how the size of the initially large vs. small plants would change if 
the TFPR were equalized in each country. The entries are the unweighted shares of 
plants. The rows are the initial (actual) plant size quartiles, and the columns are the 
bins of the efficient plant size relative to the actual size: 0%–50% (where the plant 
should shrink by half or more), 50%–100%, 100%–200%, and 200+% (where the 
plant should at least double in size). Although the aggregate output increases in the 
optimal case when distortions are removed, many establishments of all sizes would 
shrink. In the U.S., China, and India in Hsieh and Klenow (2009), initially large 
plants are less likely to shrink and are more likely to expand. The remarkable 
feature in Korea is that this pattern is much more pronounced. For the top size 
quartile in Korea, the share of plants which produce less than their efficient level is 
16.3% (100%-200% + 200+%), while this rate is 10.6% in the U.S. and 12.0% in 
China. In contrast, the share of plants which should shrink in terms of efficient 
output is higher in Korea than in other countries. For the plants located in the 
bottom quartile, the share of plants which produce more than their optimal output is 
19.1% (0%-50% + 50%-100%), while it is 16.7% in the U.S. and 16.4% in China.  
 
TABLE 7—PERCENTAGES OF PLANTS: ACTUAL SIZE VS. EFFICIENT SIZE 
(UNIT: %) 
Korea (1990-2012) 
0-50% 50-100% 100-200% 200% 
Bottom quartile 10.4 8.7  4.1  1.8  
3rd quartile 5.5 9.1  6.8 3.7  
2nd quartile 3.8  7.7 7.2  6.3  
Top size quartile 2.5  6.2  7.4  8.9  
The U.S. 1997 
0-50 50-100 100-200 200 
Bottom quartile 4.7 12.0 4.3 4.1 
3rd quartile 4.5 9.8 5.4 5.4 
2nd quartile 4.4 9.6 5.8 5.1 
Top size quartile 4.4 10.0 6.7 3.9 
China 2005 
0-50 50-100 100-200 200 
Bottom quartile 10.5 5.9 4.5 4.2 
3rd quartile 8.5 6.0 5.2 5.4 
2nd quartile 7.3 5.9 5.3 6.6 
Top size quartile 7.0 6.1 5.4 6.6 
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FIGURE 3. DEVIATION OF ACTUAL OUTPUT AGAINST EFFICIENT OUTPUT BY FIRM SIZE 
 
 
FIGURE 4. DEVIATION OF ACTUAL OUTPUT AGAINST EFFICIENT OUTPUT BY FIRM AGE 
 
Figure 3 shows the related average ,100 log( / )si efficient siY Y  of each percentile 
with reference to the plant size. This shows that the larger the firm, the less the firm 
produces compared to its efficient level, with the degree of the tendency 
quantitatively intensifying. This figure reinforces the results shown in Table 7.  
The results also imply that many small-sized establishments are uncompetitive in 
the Korean manufacturing sector. In other words, small-sized establishments 
exploit factor inputs which exceed the optimal amounts. Thus, it is favorable for 
the entire economy when unproductive small-sized establishments reduce their 
production and more productive, large plants take resources which had been held 
by these small establishments. Indirectly, it also implies that unselective support for 
all small-sized establishments may impede the healthy circulation of exits by 
unproductive plants and entries by productive ones.  
Figure 4 displays the patterns of production compared to the efficient level in 
terms of the plant age. Generally, it was found that the younger the firms, the less 
they produced compared to the efficient production level and the older the firms, 
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the more excessively they produced. The older the firm, the further the deviation of 
the actual output from the efficient level above zero, yet the extent of deviation 
does not exceed 10%.  
Financial friction and adjustment costs are commonly mentioned as the main 
culprits behind instances of capital misallocation. Financial constraints are 
considered as an important difference between rich and poor countries, leading to 
productivity gaps by country (Banerjee and Duflo 2005). However, Midrigan and 
Xu (2009) point out that financial friction contributes little to account for the 
variance of the average product of capital using Korean manufacturing survey data 
identical to ours.2 Hsieh and Klenow (2009) examine how much differences in 
adjustment costs explain the extent of misallocation for the U.S., China, and India. 
The variations in the adjustment costs explain only a modest amount of the overall 
dispersion in the TFPR. Midrigan and Xu (2009) also mention the role of 
adjustment costs and conclude that the quantitative effect of adjustment costs on 
misallocation is marginal. 
 
V. Concluding Remarks 
 
Allocative efficiency in the Korean manufacturing sector (0.65) showed a 
downward trend from the 1990s to 2012. On average, allocative efficiency is 
approximately 0.65, which is lower than that of the U.S. (0.73), similar to the level 
in Japan (0.68) and higher than that in China (0.50). If allocative efficiency does 
not decrease in the case of Korea, the manufacturing TFP growth rate is estimated 
to climb by an additional 0.6%p on an annual basis.  
As the productivity gap between large and small plants in Korea is higher than 
those in other countries, this paper empirically presents that the over-production of 
small-sized plants and the under-production of relatively large plants are 
noticeable. This implies that one type of distortion which makes the market less 
efficient may be extensive subsidies to small-sized plants. However, caution is 
needed when interpreting this empirical result regarding productivity differences by 
size. First, even within the same industry which is narrowly defined, products by 
small and large plants may not be homogeneous. In such a case, a unilateral 
comparison of productivity by size is not appropriate because goods markets are 
different. Second, there is a possibility that unfair vertical relationships enjoyed by 
large firms with small subcontractors may contain a measurement error of 
productivity. The productivity of large firms may be overestimated and that of 
small firms may be underestimated. As such, there may be deviations in 
estimations of efficient production rates. Third, we should be more careful when 
devising firm-related policy implications using the results, as our analysis is 
dependent on plant-level data and not firm-level data. Even bearing these 
possibilities in mind, the clear pattern of under- and over-production by size, as in 
Figure 3, stresses that this consistent pattern by size likely does not derive only due 
 
2Midrigan and Xu (2014) note that the potential effect of financial frictions can be large because it impedes 
the entry of productive plants without enough money into the market.  
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to heterogeneous products or from abuse by the market dominance of large firms.3 
From this perspective, this paper recommends that it is desirable to concentrate 
more on selective support for younger and smaller firms with consideration of their 
growth potential rather than on providing unilateral support to all small-sized firms. 
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